On October 5th, during the National Day celebration at Taipei’s Arena, President Lai Ching-te introduced his concept of “national identity,” highlighting the notion that the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to one another. What was the reaction from U.S. officials regarding this statement?

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Daniel Kritenbrink, provided a cautious response. He stressed the importance of Taiwan remaining vigilant and advised against any self-congratulation, warning that Taipei should avoid actions that could jeopardize U.S. interests. He made it clear that Taiwan must not position itself as a disruptor of the existing status quo.

In his inauguration speech on May 20th, President Lai introduced the idea of mutual independence between the two nations. The immediate response from the U.S. State Department was to direct such inquiries to Taiwanese authorities, while simultaneously welcoming Lai’s pledges to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and to uphold the current state of cross-strait relations.

As a leading U.S. figure for East Asia, Kritenbrink reiterated the importance of routing questions to the Taiwanese government. Despite an initially friendly atmosphere, he underscored the U.S. perspective based on the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiqués with China, and the Six Assurances, specifically opposing any unilateral alteration of the status quo by either side. The U.S. does not endorse Taiwanese independence and advocates for peaceful resolutions to cross-strait differences.

In the less than six months since President Lai assumed office, there has been a subtle evolution in the U.S. stance—from initially welcoming his presidency to reemphasizing the One China policy. Nevertheless, Washington’s consistent message emphasizes its commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, urging both parties to avoid actions that might intensify tensions.

While Kritenbrink’s comments are not unprecedented, their importance shifts depending on the context, conveying different meanings and implications to the involved parties.

Historically, in late 2003, then-President Chen Shui-bian sought re-election with a referendum strategy. At that time, the U.S. advised against escalating election rhetoric to prevent heightened regional tensions. Shortly thereafter, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly explicitly articulated America’s opposition to any unilateral changes to the status quo concerning cross-strait relations.

In December of the same year, President Bush, following discussions with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, clearly expressed U.S. opposition to any potential unilateral changes by Taiwan’s leaders to the status quo.

Back then, it was clear who was perceived as shifting the status quo—Bush made the U.S. position unambiguous.

Moving to 2005, Beijing enacted an anti-secession law that encouraged non-peaceful means of achieving unification. The U.S. government responded similarly by opposing unilateral changes to the status quo, with a focus squarely on Beijing.

Today, Kritenbrink’s affirmation of the U.S. position against unilateral changes from either Beijing or Taipei highlights America’s core interest in sustaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This focus transcends merely managing pre-election tensions; it addresses broader future implications, suggesting that any destabilization in the Taiwan Strait would adversely affect U.S. interests.

As President Lai’s concept of “national identity” takes center stage in discussions, there is growing curiosity about how he will navigate these complex issues moving forward. Both Washington and Beijing are keenly observing, especially considering predictions from Taiwanese security experts about potential military exercises from China following the Double Tenth National Day celebrations. The context and ramifications of Kritenbrink’s statements are critical for Lai’s administration to consider.